I turn now to the Court's asserted reliance on the Fifth Amendment, an approach which I frankly regard as a tromp l'oeil. The Court's opinion, in my v

HARLAN, J., Dissenting Opinion

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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384 U.S. 436

Miranda v. Arizona

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

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No. 759 Argued: February 28-March 1, 1966 --- Decided: June 13, 1966 [*]

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MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join, dissenting.

I believe the decision of the Court represents poor constitutional law and entails harmful consequences for the country at large. How serious these consequences may prove to be, only time can tell. But the basic flaws in the Court's justification seem to me readily apparent now, once all sides of the problem are considered.

I turn now to the Court's asserted reliance on the Fifth Amendment, an approach which I frankly regard as a tromp l'oeil. The Court's opinion, in my view, reveals no adequate basis for extending the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination to the police station.

The foray which the Court makes today brings to mind the wise and farsighted words of Mr. Justice Jackson in Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (separate opinion):

This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added.

1. My discussion in this opinion is directed to the main questions decided by the Court and necessary to its decision; in ignoring some of the collateral points, I do not mean to imply agreement.